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THE SUPREME COURT IN POLITICS 
Terrance Sanda/ow* 
BATILE FOR JUSTICE: How THE BORK NOMINATION SHOOK 
AMERICA. By Ethan Bronner. New York: W.W. Norton. 1989. Pp. 
12, 399. $22.50. 
Despite all that has been written about the bitter struggle initiated 
by President Reagan's nomination of Robert Bork to a seat on the 
Supreme· court, its most remarkable feature, that it was waged over a 
judicial appointment, has drawn relatively little comment. Two hun-
dred years after the Philadelphia Convention, Hamilton's "least dan-
gerous" branch - least dangerous because it would have "no 
influence over either the sword or the purse, no direction either of the 
strength or the wealth of the society, and can take no active resolution 
whatever"1-had come to occupy so important a place in the nation's 
political life that the question of its future course was capable of gener-
ating a controversy more intense and more divisive than all but a very 
few contests for political office. 
In the summer of 1987, when Judge Bork was nominated, the 
United States was plagued by foreign trade and budget deficits that 
arguably marked the beginning of a long-term economic decline. 
Hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of Americans were home-
less, the most visible symptom of the still unsolved problem of wide-
spread poverty in the midst of plenty. Despite important progress in 
civil rights during the previous twenty-five years, the besetting issue of 
race persisted, amid signs that the conditions of life and future pros-
pects of a large segment of the black population were deteriorating. 
Both the educational and medical care systems were widely acknowl-
edged to require significant repair. 
The likely influence of the Supreme Court on these and other vital 
issues facing the nation ranges between negligible and nonexistent.2 
Yet, President Reagan declared that securing Bork's confirmation 
would be his highest domestic priority during the remainder of his 
term (p. 214). The implicit judgment about the importance of the ap-
pointment might be discounted on the ground that Reagan was a 
* Edson R. Sunderland Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1954, J.D. 1957, 
University of Chicago. - Ed. 
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 521, 523 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
2. Racial,,.issues are perhaps an exception, but because of increased black political power and 
the character of the problems that must be confronted now and in the years ahead, the judiciary's 
influence on the way those issues are addressed is likely to be far less in the future than it has 
been for the past several decades. 
1300 
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"lame duck," presiding over an administration weakened by scandal 
and bereft of ideas for addressing the nation's problems. Still, others 
thought the appointment even more important than he did. In a full-
page ad published in leading newspapers, Planned Parenthood de-
clared that "[t]he Senate vote on Bork may be more important than 
the next presidential election."3 The authors of the ad may have been 
overwrought because they feared that Judge Bork's appointment 
would threaten continued constitutional protection for the reproduc-
tive freedoms that Planned Parenthood exists to promote, but just a 
few years earlier, in a calmer moment, Laurence Tribe had written 
that "much more might ... be at stake in ... nominations [to the 
Supreme Court] than in nearly anything else that might be done - or 
undone - by the President who took ... office on January 20, 1985."4 
The reason, Tribe went on to explain, is that "fundamental choices 
about what sort of society we wish to become turn on who sits on the 
Court."5 
Perhaps these extravagant _assessments of the significance of a 
Supreme Court appointment should all be attributed to a myopia pro-
duced by the special circumstances and positions of their authors. 
Similar judgments were, however, a commonplace of newspaper edito-
rials, television talk shows, and myriad casual conversations among 
the attentive public. Yet, few seemed to notice how remarkable it is 
that the appointment of a Supreme Court justice should be thought to 
have such importance. Judicial review of the constitutionality of legis-
lation, once a distinctive feature of American government, is now a 
relatively common practice in democratic nations. Yet, surely there is 
no other country in which a judicial appointment would be thought to 
have anything like the significance that so many people now attribute 
to a Supreme Court appointment. 
The reason so many Americans have come to regard the composi-
tion of the Court as so important is not shrouded in mystery. During 
the past several decades, the Court has found in the Constitution an-
swers to an extraordinary variety of questions of public policy. Issues 
traditionally regarded as within the domain of Congress and state leg-
islatures are now decided by courts, not only by the Supreme Court of 
course, but nevertheless within a framework that it establishes. The 
Court has thus emerged as one of the major policymaking institutions 
of American government. Even those who believe, as I do, that the 
importance of its decisions is often greatly exaggerated are bound to 
recognize that it exerts considerable influence over wide areas of life. 
3. Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United 
States: Hearings Before the Comm. of the Judiciary, United States Senate, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 
4453 (1989) [hereinafter Hearings]. 
4. L. TRIBE, Goo SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT ix (1985). 
5. Id. at xviii. 
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And since there is no greater consensus about the appropriate direc-
tion of constitutional law than there is about the directions in which 
the nation should move in other arenas of public policy, the question 
of who should sit on the Supreme Court takes on the same importance 
as the question of who should occupy other significant policymaking 
offices. 
However remarkable it may be that judges should have such 
power, once they do it is all but inevitable that their selection will at 
times become a matter of intense public interest. As the domain of 
constitutional law expands, and the bases of constitutional decisions 
are seen to approximate those of other policy decisions, 6 citizens ac-
customed to participating in the election of their political leaders un-
derstandably will expect to participate in the selection of Supreme 
Court justices. It should occasion no surprise, therefore, that the 
question whether Judge Bork should be confirmed led to a campaign 
strongly resembling a campaign for high political office. 
Since 1960, when Theodore White published his first Making of the 
President, post-mortems of presidential campaigns have become a 
journalistic staple. Fittingly, we now have two books that recount the 
battle fought over the Bork nomination. 7 One of them, The People 
Rising, by Michael Pertschuk and Wendy Schaetzel, 8 considers only 
the campaign conducted by those who opposed the nomination. Both 
authors are associated with the Advocacy Institute, which they de-
scribe as an organization "dedicated to capturing and disseminating 
learning about citizen advocacy in order to strengthen the capacity of 
all citizen groups effectively to pursue their own visions of truth and 
justice,"9 a description whose accuracy depends upon excluding from 
the class of "all citizens" those whose "visions of truth and justice" do 
not coincide with the currents of contemporary liberalism. Among 
Pertschuk and Schaetzel's stated objectives in writing the book are, 
first, "to help those who would understand or be effective citizen advo-
cates to learn the lessons drawn from the campaign,"10 and second, to 
assess the importance of the campaign in securing Bork's defeat. 11 
What they have written, instead, is a paean to the "adept," "prudent/' 
"wise," "brilliant," "warm," "direct," "pragmatic," dedicated, selfless 
men and women of uncommon vision who led the campaign, those 
6. See Nagel, Political Law, Legislative Politics: A Recent History of the Political Question 
Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 643 (1989). 
7. Judge Bork has also undertaken to write about the controversy, but only in the context of 
a book devoted mainly to questions of constitutional theory. R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF 
AMERICA (1990). 
8. M. PERTSCHUK & W. SCHAETZEL, THE PEOPLE RISING: THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE 
BORK NOMINATION (1989). 
9. Id. at xi. 
10. Id. at 8. 
11. Id. at 9. 
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whom they describe, without intended humor, as "a guerrilla band of 
citizens lobbying for liberty."12 
Books about campaigns, Maureen Dowd recently wrote in review-
ing a book about the Dukakis campaign, are of interest chiefly to those 
who are mentioned, and even they "will be sufficiently satisfied by a 
scrutiny of the index, and a look at the passages about themselves."13 
Read in this way, The People Rising should be a thoroughly enjoyable 
experience, not only for individuals mentioned, but also for their 
mothers. The only others to whom the book might be recommended 
are those in whom the title produces a shiver of excitement. 
I do not mean to suggest that readers who do not fit within these 
categories will find nothing of interest in the book. One learns from it, 
for example, that many of Nan Aron's female relatives "were very 
feisty women" who "were involved in social movements" and that her 
daughters, one named for Emma Willard and Emma Lazarus and the 
other for an aunt active in the civil rights movement, "give every indi-
cation of following the same path."14 So too, one discovers that Me-
lanne Verveer spends so much time on the telephone that her co-
workers presented her with a toy telephone at their organization's an-
nual Christmas party.15 On a more analytic level, Pertschuk and 
Schaetzel's study reveals that hard work, willingness to put aside per-
sonal and organizational interest, and communication - even with 
"difficult" people16 - are important in building a coalition. Perhaps 
even more startlingly, it also reveals that there are people "beyond the 
Beltway" who are well-informed and have useful ideas. 
"The germ of this book," the authors write in a concluding biblio-
graphic essay, "was a class project in a course at New York University 
Law School on public interest non-litigative advocacy."17 It is proba-
bly too late to wonder why a university would offer such a course, but 
the hope may at least be expressed that, if the course is offered again, 
The People Rising will not be a required text. 
Ethan Bronner's18 Battle for Justice, in sharp contrast with The 
People Rising, is an engagingly told and solid journalistic account of 
12. Id. at 7. This "guerrilla band," as their own book reveals, included many of Washing-
ton's most seasoned political operatives, the leadership of powerful national organizations, lead-
ing members of the bar, and many of the Senate's most influential members. 
13. Dowd, Return of the Living Dead, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 11, 1989, at 44-45. 
14. M. PERTSCHUK & W. SCHAETZEL, supra note 8, at 47. 
15. Id. at 56. 
16. Le., people who are "prickly, garrulous, petty, negative (and draining), distrustful (if not 
paranoid), righteous, self-important, [and] unlovable." Id. This conclusion does not seem to 
have emerged from the authors' investigation of the campaign against Judge Bork since, on the 
evidence of their book, there appear to have been no such people in the coalition that opposed 
confirmation. 
17. Id. at 306. 
18. Bronner reports on the Supreme Court and legal affairs for the Boston Globe. 
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the controversy. Although his sympathies can be discerned - they 
are not with Bork - they are kept well under control. With admira-
ble clarity, Bronner takes the reader through the President's decision 
to nominate Bork, the campaign waged on both sides, the hearings 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Senate debate, and the af-
termath: the ill-fated nomination of Judge Ginsburg and the appoint-
ment of Justice Kennedy. Background information about the major 
participants, the Court, and the controversies surrounding its deci-
sions is skillfully woven into the story. Lay members of the reading 
public and the many lawyers whose work does not require close atten-
tion to the Court are the book's natural audience, but even Court-
watchers who followed the controversy - can there be any who 
didn't? - may find it a stimulant to reflection on an episode that may 
open a new chapter in the Court's history. 19 
Despite the strengths of Bronner's account, disagreements and dis-
appointments with it are bound to occur. My own center on what 
might be called the "Republican side of the story." The book does 
not, for example, shed much light on the question of why Bork was 
nominated. To be sure, Bork's professional credentials and intellec-
tual qualifications were outstanding, as impressive as those of any 
nominee in a good many years and more impressive than most. 
Although that circumstance was presumably not irrelevant to the 
President's decision to nominate him, it would be na'ive to suppose it 
was decisive - or even a very influential consideration. Of greater 
importance, surely, was Reagan's commitment to appointing justices 
who shared his Administration's constitutional philosophy. One sus-
pects, moreover, that the President and his advisors were less inter-
ested in the abstractions of constitutional theory than in Bork's well-
known disagreement with various decisions of which they also disap-
proved - most notably, of course, Roe v. Wade 20 and its progeny. 
Perhaps there is nothing more to be said about the decision. As 
Bronner reports, however, Reagan knew that Bork would be an excep-
tionally controversial nominee, vehemently opposed by forces that 
were bound to have an important influence upon the Senate's Demo-
cratic majority: "pro-choice" groups (p. 26) and the civil rights com-
munity that just two years earlier had blocked William Bradford 
Reynolds' promotion to Associate Attorney General.21 Indeed, the 
public campaign against Bork began even before the nomination was 
announced (pp. 37-38). Reagan's respect for the intense opposition 
that Bork would engender had been demonstrated just a year before 
19. See infra text accompanying notes 35-39, 75-92. 
20. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
21. Pp. 48-50. Several days before Bork's nomination, Ralph Neas, Executive Director of 
the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, had informed a high-ranking White House staff 
member that the selection of Bork would "cause a fire storm." P. 36. 
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when, in what Bronner characterizes as· "a complex political calcula-
tion" (p. 32), he passed over Bork and named Antonin Scalia to fill a 
vacancy on the Court even though Republicans then controlled the 
Senate. 
Since in 1987, as in 1986, there were other possible nominees who, 
though less controversial than Bork, held similar views, the inevitable 
question is why Bork was nominated. Bronner's account is too thin to 
shed light on the answer. He does report that as soon as Justice Pow-
ell's retirement became known, conservatives in the Justice Depart-
ment and staff members of what he dubs "ultraconservative lobbies" 
(p. 28) mounted a campaign on behalf of Bork, whom they appear to 
have regarded as an important symbol in their efforts to reshape the 
Court. Rightly concerned that the more moderate and more prag-
matic Howard Baker, recently installed as White House Chief of Staff, 
would favor a less controversial nominee, they looked to Attorney 
General Edwin Meese to press for Bork's nomination. Meese did 
make his views known to the President - we are not told what they 
were - but Bronner was apparently unable to penetrate whatever de-
liberations took place among Reagan, Meese and other high-level ad-
visors. In the end, therefore, the book provides no information about 
the calculations that entered into the decision to nominate Bork rather 
than someone who would just as surely help to change the Court's 
direction, but who would engender less opposition (pp. 28-33). 
My own speculation - obviously it is no more than that - is that 
Reagan and his closest advisors did not mind the controversy and may 
have welcomed it. Just because Bork had become a symbol, the nomi-
nation offered an embattled administration an opportunity to begin 
drawing battle lines for the next election, which was little more than a 
year away, and to activate important elements of Republican strength, 
ideological conservatives and the "anti-abortion" movement. 
Whether the nomination succeeded or was defeated, it would be a 
sharp reminder of the importance of the power to appoint members of 
the Court. I do not mean to suggest that the President anticipated 
defeat, but the failure of the Reynolds nomination must have alerted 
him to the possibility, and the risk must have seemed worth taking. 
If these were the President's calculations, however - indeed, even 
if they were not - the Administration behaved very oddly in the 
months ahead. Between July 1, when the nomination was announced, 
and the commencement of the Judiciary Committee hearings in mid-
September, opponents of confirmation were engaged in a massive cam-
paign to arouse public sentiment against Bork and thereby exert pres-
sure upon the twenty to thirty Senators whose votes were not fully 
predictable. The Administration, however, proceeded as though this 
were a routine, if somewhat controversial, nomination in which unde-
cided Senators would cast their votes on the basis of the record, unin-
1306 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 88:1300 
fluenced by public opinion. The President did support the nomination 
in a few speeches, though no major ones, but the Administration 
seemed mainly intent upon damping controversy.22 Bronner reports 
that the White House, which was managing the campaign, discour-
aged conservative groups from becoming too publicly involved (p. 
200), presumably to avoid fueling the charge that Bork was a "right-
wing" ideologue. To counter that claim, it emphasized his credentials 
and, astonishingly, attempted to cast him as a "moderate" in Justice 
Powell's image. 
The strategy, though disingenuous, may have made some sense at 
the outset. The undecided Senators were themselves "moderates" who 
might be won over by assurances that Bork was not a right-wing ideo-
logue. Moreover, if the controversy could be contained within Wash-
ington, confirmation seemed likely, in part because presidential 
nominations have an inertial force and, as Bronner suggests, perhaps 
also because Bork, a Washington "insider," might be expected to win 
an "inside" contest (p. 157). Within a month or six weeks of the nom-
ination, however, it was apparent that the opposition had succeeded in 
its effort to take the issue to the country. Whether Bork should be 
confirmed was no longer just an "insider's" question. Yet, the White 
House did not alter its strategy in response to the new reality, a failure 
that Bronner does not adequately explain. 
The failure, it seems to me, was largely an intellectual one, an in-
ability to devise a strategy that would rouse public support for Bork as 
intense as the opposition that had been aroused against him,23 without 
fueling the charge that he was a conservative zealot and thereby risk-
ing the loss of Senate moderates. Although plainly in tension, the two 
objectives were not irreconcilable. The Administration need only have 
pursued a course roughly opposite to that taken by the anti-Bork 
forces. The leadership of the anti-Bork coalition had decided early on 
"to avoid the A words - abortion and affirmative action"24 and to 
emphasize instead "privacy" and "civil rights." The tactic not only 
enabled them to avoid issues on which they were politically vulnerable 
22. The attempt is not necessarily inconsistent with the speculation that Reagan may have 
welcomed the controversy. Responsibility for securing Bork's confirmation fell to Howard 
Baker, who apparently did not play a major part in the nomination decision. Attorney General 
Meese, who is likely to have had an important influence on the nomination decision, did not 
actively participate in the struggle over confirmation, apparently because he was occupied by his 
own difficulties. P. 35. It seems entirely plausible, therefore, that the nomination decision and 
the effort to achieve confirmation might have been grounded in quite different premises. 
23. Bork did have a considerable amount of public support - Senators actually received 
more mail supporting confirmation than opposing it (p. 201)- but it lacked the intensity of the 
opposition. Senator John Breaux of Louisiana captured the difference precisely when he told a 
meeting of Southern Democrats that "[i]f you vote against Bork, those in favor of him will be 
mad at you for a week. But if you vote for him, those who don't like him will be mad at you for 
the rest of your lives." P. 287. 
24. P. 160 (quoting Ricki Seidman of People for the American Way (PAW)); see also M. 
PERTSCHUK & w. SCHAETZEL, supra note 8, at 128. 
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and to capture two powerful rhetorical symbols, but also to focus at-
tention on Bork's criticisms of decisions such as Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 25 Shelley v. Kraemer, 26 and Harper v. Virginia Board of 
Elections, 27 making it appear that his confirmation would somehow 
serve to reopen controversies that had long since been settled. 
The obvious course for the Administration was to circumvent the 
opposition's strategy by using the issues the latter feared to build a 
base of more passionate public support for the appointment. The 
message the Administration needed to convey was not a very compli-
cated one. It was simply that the live issue of "privacy" was not con-
traception, as the opponent's emphasis on Griswold suggested, but 
abortion, and that the pressing "civil rights" issue was not the validity 
of restrictive covenants, poll taxes, or literacy tests, but the use of ra-
cial "quotas." A campaign emphasizing abortion and racial quotas 
might not have been welcomed by Senate moderates, but it need not 
have alienated them. It might well have moved some, perhaps espe-
cially Southern Democrats, in Bork's direction, drawing attention 
away from the concern that his appointment would reopen old 
wounds and, probably more significantly, imposing a high price on a 
vote against confirmation. Southern Democrats were under intense 
pressure from black constituents, to whom many owed election. The 
pressure might be overcome, if at all, only by arousing emotions 
among Bork's supporters that were as intense as those that had been 
aroused in his opponents. 2s 
The Administration's failure to mount a massive public campaign 
emphasizing abortion and affirmative action was, in a number of ways, 
fortunate. A campaign along those lines would surely have added to 
the divisiveness of the controversy and it could easily have degener-
ated into ugliness of a kind that marred the campaign against Bork. 29 
But the failure to conduct such a campaign may well have cost Bork 
the appointment. 30 
In the end, the Administration failed to develop any theme in sup-
25. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding state statute prohibiting use of contraceptives invalid under 
the fourteenth amendment). • 
26. 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding state court enforcement of racially restrictive home sale cove-
nants to be violative of the fourteenth amendment). 
27. 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (holding poll tax to be violative of the equal protection clause of the 
fourteenth amendment). 
28. See infra text accompanying notes 40-60. 
29. See infra notes 43-61 and accompanying text. 
30. In an interview some time after the Senate vote, Howard Baker is reported to have said 
that "I can't think of a single vote Bork would have gotten if we had had a mobilization of 
conservative rhetoric on those issues,'' referring to civil rights and the expansion of individual 
rights by the Warren and Burger Courts. Although acknowledging that the statement was self-
serving, Bronner opines that "it seems right,'' a judgment he supports by invoking a poll con-
ducted by the anti-Bork coalition which found that "Americans would be inclined by over-
whelming margins to disapprove of a prospective Supreme Court candidate who had criticized 
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port of the nomination, save for the bland ones that Bork was excep-
tionally well qualified and that he was not the extremist his opponents 
sought to depict. The effects of that failure were palpable in the Judi-
ciary Committee hearings. By the time the hearings began, of course, 
the issue may already have been decided. Despite occasional protesta-
tions that the Senate's judgment would be made "on the record," the 
rising tide of public opposition had very likely determined the votes of 
most undeclared Senators. What the hearings offered, at most, was a 
last-ditch opportunity to sway public opinion, mainly by intensifying 
Bork's political support. Their effect, however, was to solidify the op-
position. 31 Senators who opposed confirmation effectively employed 
the hearings to hammer away at themes for which the public and the 
media had been prepared by the campaign waged during the preceding 
months. 32 Bork's supporters on the Committee lacked a similar plat-
form. For that reason, among others, they were singularly ineffective. 
Bronner's account of the hearings, although excellent in many re-
spects, is flawecl by his failure to deal with the inadequacies of Bork's 
supporters on the Committee. He covers their performance mainly in 
a chapter, entitled "Missed Opportunities," that focuses on a number 
of gaffes Bork committed while testifying and on Bork's failure to re-
spond effectively to a number of "soft pitches" fed to him by Republi-
cans. The impression it conveys is that Bork alone was responsible for 
the failure to turn the hearings to his advantage. But though Bork did 
commit some gaffes and did at times respond ineffectively - e.g., by 
failing to give answers that would provide good "sound bites" on the 
evening news33 - the hearings might well have played differently had 
Committee Republicans provided more adequate support or, to put it 
more bluntly, had they not been hopelessly outclassed by their Demo-
cratic counterparts. 
A portent: of their performance at the hearings was provided 
shortly after the nomination when Strom Thurmond, the ranking Re-
publican, consented to Chairman Joseph Biden's decision to postpone 
the hearings until mid-September (p. 229), thereby giving critics of the 
nomination the time they required to mount a public campaign. Once 
the hearings began, Thurmon~ and other Committee Republicans con-
recent civil rights gains or revealed a reluctance to acknowledge a constitutional right to pri-
vacy." P. 348. 
The question, however, is not whether Americans generally approved of recent gains by mi-
norities or of a generalized right to privacy, which they had been led to believe was the only 
reason contraceptives are legally available, but whether large numbers might have been mobil-
ized by a more particularized appeal directed to abortion and affirmative action. My characteri-
zation of the Administration's failure as "intellectual" rests precisely on its failure to perceive 
that distinction. 
31. Surveys of public opinion revealed that opposition to confirmation rose during the hear-
ings. See pp. 301, 308. 
32. See infra notes 40-61 and accompanying text. 
33. See infra text accompanying notes 86-89. 
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tinued to be inattentive to the politics of the situation. Apparently 
without objection from Republicans, surely without public cries of un-
fairness, Democrats were permitted to time the appearance of wit- . 
nesses to maximize the television exposure of those opposed to the 
nomination and to deny coverage to those who supported it. At one 
point, Thurmond even acceded to a request by Senator Edward Ken-
nedy to defer testimony by witnesses who favored nomination in order 
to hear two opponents whose testimony was intended to cast doubt on 
the veracity of Bork's account of the events leading to the appointment 
of Leon Jaworski as Watergate Special Prosecutor,34 thus facilitating 
coverage of the latter on the network news. 
The Republicans' ineptness continued into the questioning of wit-
nesses. In contrast with the Democrats, whose questions exhibited 
both an awareness that the purpose of the hearings was to influence 
public opinion and a strategy for doing so, the Republicans were, in 
the main, defensive and unfocused. In part, their ineffectiveness was 
attributable to the Administration's failure to develop a powerful af-
firmative theme in support of the nomination, but it was also of their 
own making. Bronner reports, for example, that Senator Biden had 
spent days with academic and other experts being coached on substan- · 
tive issues that would arise at the hearings (p. 210). There is no report 
of similar preparation by any of the Republicans, and a review of their 
questioning suggests that there was none. Often, their questions 
merely served to provide opposition witnesses with additional oppor-
tunities to make the case against Bork. Follow-up questions that 
might have put the latter's answers in an unfavorable light went 
unasked. And while Democrats continued to drive home the point 
that average citizens had an important stake in the outcome of the 
controversy, Republicans too often raised points that were unlikely to 
interest anyone. Senator Alan Simpson, for example, continually re-
turned to the silly claim that holding Bork responsible for positions 
taken in his academic writings would chill professorial expression. 
The central chapters of the nomination story are not, however, 
those that deal with what Bork's Republican supporters did or did not 
do, but those involving the campaign waged against confirmation. 
Shortly after his resignation from the Court of Appeals, Judge Bork 
rightly said that the controversy over his nomination had led to "the 
first all-out political campaign with respect to a judicial nominee in 
the country's history" (p. 341). To be sure, controversy over Supreme 
Court nominations is not all that unusual. Approximately one fifth of 
all nominees have not been confirmed,35 including five since 1968. No 
34. Hearings, supra note 3, at 3192-93 (testimony of George Frampton and Henry Ruth); see 
also id. at 3190-91. 
35. L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 78. For a complete list of nominees and the action taken on 
them through 1985, see id. at 142-51. 
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previous confirmation controversy, however, involved an appeal to the 
public on the scale that occurred in the controversy over Judge Bork, 
an appeal that very nearly converted the confirmation process into a 
referendum on his appointment. But though the process leading to 
Bork's rejection by the Senate was unprecedented, signs that the na-
tion was heading toward greater public participation in the selection of 
Supreme Court Justices have been appearing for years. Most obvi-
ously, five of the eleven nominees during the twenty years preceding 
the Bork nomination aroused public controversy and efforts to bring 
public opinion to bear on the Senate. 36 At least in retrospect, more-
over, there were also other signs - the volume of mail now received 
by members of the Court, 37 demonstrations aimed at informing the 
Court of the demonstrators' views on pending cases, and increased me-
dia attention to the work of the Court, including in several instances 
massive news blitzes in anticipation of important cases equivalent to 
those that occur, on rare occasion, when issues of great national im-
port are under consideration by the political branches. 
Although unprecedented, therefore, the campaign waged against 
confirmation may not be a historical anomaly, but the opening of a 
new chapter in the Court's history. To suggest that possibility is not, 
of course, to suggest that every nomination will be as controversial or 
will lead to a similar campaign. Presidents will, at times and perhaps 
often, wish to avoid controversy rather than to stimulate it. The Sen-
ate may be controlled by the president's party, significantly reducing 
the prospects for a successful campaign against confirmation. But the 
underlying source of the dispute over the Bork nomination - the con-
troversial character of the Court's decisions and their importance in 
shaping national policy - did not end with his defeat. 38 The lesson to 
be drawn from the campaign against confirmation is that citizens can 
be mobilized on the issue of Supreme Court appointments. That les-
son is not likely to be forgotten as long as the Court continues to play 
the role that it has during the past several decades. A look at the 
campaign may, therefore, provide a preview of the future. It may also 
raise questions about the wisdom of assigning that role to the Court. 39 
Reports on the cost of the campaign differ widely, even wildly. 
36. The five nominations are those of Abe Fortas, Clement Haynsworth, G. Harold Carswell, 
and William Rehnquist (twice). Both that number and the total of eleven exclude the nomina-
tion of Homer Thornberry, on whose nomination no action was required because of Justice For-
tas' failure to win confirmation as Chief Justice. 
37. Justice Blackmun has said that he has received over 50,000 letters regarding abortion. 
38. My point here is not that the Court's role is controversial, but that its decisions are. A 
few law professors and perhaps some other odd people may worry about whether courts or legis-
latures should determine whether or under what circumstances women should have the freedom 
to obtain abortions, whether racial preferences should be employed, or other issues of conse-
quence, but the general public is largely oblivious or indifferent to that and other questions of 
governmental structure. Their concern is with the substantive resolution of the issues. 
39. See infra text accompanying notes 75-92. 
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Bronner concludes that "all the anti-Bork groups together did not 
spend more than a few million dollars. "40 Several weeks before the 
hearings, however, Time projected that the combined expenditure of 
groups on both sides would exceed $20 million, an estimate supported 
by a New York Times report that anti-Bork forces had raised $12 mil-
lion and pro-Bork forces $6 million by the time the hearings began.41 
Whatever the cost, it is clear that the anti-Bork coalition ran a cam-
paign that employed many of the highly sophisticated techniques of 
modem political campaigns. Focus groups and public opinion polls 
were employed to ascertain the issues that could best be exploited. 42 
"Actualities," radio spots that sound like news, and "video news re-
leases," an equivalent product for television, were "meticulously pro-
duced and aggressively promoted" (p. 146). Media consultants were 
retained to manage relationships with reporters and editors, to moni-
tor trends in media coverage, and to assist in devising a strategy for 
gaining favorable coverage. Among the lessons taught by the consul-
tants was that paid advertisements can be an effective technique for 
achieving the latter goal. Advertisements, it seems, are understood by 
editors and producers as a token of the seriousness of a campaign and, 
if sufficiently catchy or controversial, may themselves become news, 
thereby generating free publicity (p. 149). 
The techniques employed by the campaign are, however, of less 
interest than its substance, although there is no doubt some relation-
ship between the two. "Actualities," "video news releases," and 
catchy newspaper advertisements are not ideal vehicles for discussing 
complex issues. Technology, however, is not responsible for the char-
acteristics of the campaign that led political columnist David Broder 
to describe it as a "lynch[ing]"43 and the Washington Post, which op-
posed the nomination, to condemn it for its "intellectual vulgarization 
and personal savagery . . . profoundly distorting the record and the 
nature of the man."44 Among its more troubling aspects is what it 
reveals about contemporary American liberalism. Liberalism in 
American politics was once defined not only by a progressive social 
agenda, but by a commitment to decency in political life. The cam-
40. P. 147. The figure apparently does not include expenditures for which there would be no 
separate accounting, such as the salaries of the substantial number of people participating in the 
campaign who were already on the payrolls of the many organizations that made up the 
coalition. 
41. Lamar, Defining the Real Robert Bork, TIME, Aug. 24, 1987, at 16; see also Berke, Fun-
draisers: Bork as a Bonanza, N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1987, at A20, col. 6. 
42. P. 158. The issue of "balance" on the Court was abandoned, for example, when a poll 
revealed that only one third of Americans knew that the Court has nine members. Id. Similarly, 
the poll made clear that abortion should not be emphasized because it was a divisive issue. P. 
159. Conversely, the polls revealed that Bork's decision in the American Cyanamid case could be 
crafted into an effective weapon. See infra notes 54-59 and accompanying text. 
43. M. PERTSCHUK & w. SCHAETZEL, supra note 8, at 208. 
44. The Bork Nomination, Wash. Post, Oct. 5, 1987, at Al4, col.1. 
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paign waged against Bork reveals how far we have come from that 
time. The objectionable features of the campaign, it is worth empha-
sizing, were not the work of individuals and groups on the fringe, but 
of political leaders and organizations that are at the center of contem-
porary American liberalism. Pertschuk and Schaetzel report, on the 
basis of extensive interviews with participants in the campaign, that 
the latter are "secure in the ethical standards to which they had held 
themselves."45 If their report is accurate, they have revealed more 
about the participants than they intended. 
Senator Kennedy opened the campaign within hours of the Presi-
dent's announcement of the nomination. "Robert Bork's America," 
Kennedy declared in a televised statement from the Senate floor, 
is a land in which women would be forced into back alley abortions, 
blacks would sit at segregated lunch counters, rogue police could break 
down citizens' doors in midnight raids, school children could not be 
taught about evolution, writers and artists could be censored at the whim 
of government, and the doors of federal courts would be shut on the 
fingers of millions of citizens for whom the judiciary is - and is often 
the only - protection of the individual rights that are the heart of our 
democracy. 46 
Kennedy's contribution to public understanding of the issues raised by 
the nomination was a harbinger of the campaign that followed. 
A series of ads run by organizations that played a leading role in 
the campaign is illustrative. The National Abortion Rights Action 
League published an ad in leading newspapers that opened with the 
following: "You wouldn't vote for a politician who threatened to wipe 
out every advance women have made in the 20th Century. Yet your 
Senators are poised to cast a vote that could do just that. " The ad went 
on to suggest that Bork's views are even more retrograde than its 
opening statement indicates, emphasizing in bold print that "[t]he 
Supreme Court nominee doesn't think vital Constitutional guarantees 
apply to women."47 
45. M. PERTSCHUK & W. SCHAETZEL, supra note 8, at ix. 
46. P. 98. It would be tedious to detail all the distortions and misrepresentations in this brief 
paragraph and in the other statements quoted hereafter. Those who read this review - not the 
audience the statements were intended to influence -will have no difficulty making them out. It 
may be worth pointing out, however, that Bork appears never to have addressed several of the 
issues - e.g., the teaching of evolution and "midnight raids" - mentioned in Kennedy's state-
ment and that he had long since abandoned positions - e.g., opposition to the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 - that might have provided a modicum of support for some of Kennedy's assertions. 
See infra note 60. 
In the course of a speech given at about the time of the Senate hearings, I said that I did not 
know whether Kennedy's statement reflected ignorance or a deliberate effort to deceive the pub-
lic, but that I could think of no other alternative. Bronner suggests one: indifference to the truth 
or falsity of the assertions. "The statement," Kennedy said subsequently, "had to be stark and 
direct so as to sound the alarm and hold people in their places until we could get material to-
gether." Bronner observes that Kennedy "never apologized for the statement. It had a func-
tion." P. 100. 
47. Hearings, supra note 3, at 4452. And again, Bork's "expedient reading of the Constitu-
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Another ad, this one run by the National Education Association 
(NEA), revealed that women were not the only citizens at risk if Bork 
were confirmed. The ad stated the views of the NEA's president, 
Mary Hatwood Futrell,48 who began, reasonably enough, by observing 
that she was deeply troubled by Bork's embrace of the doctrine of 
"original intent." She then went on to explain: 
Had America held tight to the doctrine of original intent, I would 
today not be a teacher. Nor would most of my colleagues. I would not 
be a citizen. Nor would most of you. And many of us would be chattel 
- items at public auction. America would be a land of a propertyless 
majority ruled by an elite consisting of white, propertied, aftluent 
males .... 
Fortunately, at critical junctures in our history, the Supreme Court 
has rejected original intent and chosen instead to bring to life the implicit 
ideals that constitute the heart of the Constitution.49 
Planned Parenthood placed ads warning that Bork's appointment 
threatened rights perhaps even more fundamental than those of citi-
zenship: ''If your Senators vote to confirm the administration's latest 
nominee," the ad declared, "you'll need more than a prescription to get 
birth control. It might take a constitutional amendment." Warming to 
the attack, the ad went on to label Bork an "extremist" who uses "ob-
scure academic theory to arrive at positions that he himself admits 
may appear 'bizarre' " and who "sees the Court not as a problem-
solver, guided by past decisions, but as a reckless trouble-maker, ag-
gressively seeking ways to upset past rulings he thinks are wrong. Re-
gardless of the social havoc that may result. Or the pain and suffering 
of innocent people."so 
tion allows 'moral majority' extremists to hope they can force their dogma on the rest of us under 
penalty of law •... as if the U.S. Constitution simply didn't apply to women." Id. 
The claim that Bork thinks (or once thought) the Constitution or some of its provisions -
particularly the equal protection clause - does not apply to women was a continuing theme of 
the campaign, eventually finding its way into the Judiciary Committee's Report. Id. at 6231. 
For an analysis of the claim, see Born, Robert H. Bork's Civil Rights Record, id. at 1485, 1516-19, 
and my prepared statement in support of the nomination, id. at 3292, 3296. 
48. To understand the ad, it must be known that Ms. Futrell is an African-American. 
49. Futrell, An Educator's Opinion: Justice Bork? We Can Do Better, Wash. Post, Sept. 27, 
1987, at D4, col. 2 (advertisement). In fairness, it should be acknowledged that several 
paragraphs later Ms. Futrell candidly stated that it did not follow from Bork's adherence to the 
doctrine of original intent that he would "undo the progress toward justice for all that the Court 
in its finest hours has wrought" or "return us to the judicial America of the 18th Century." Id at 
col. 3. The decisive questions, she wrote, were whether he would "continue America's steady 
march toward full rights for all Americans" and whether "America [can] afford to place on the 
Supreme Court a man whose erudition carries the threat of judicial stagnation." Id. 
With allowance for the rhetorical flourishes, those were indeed among the decisive - and 
entirely legitimate - questions raised by the nomination. A campaign directed to them might 
have made a significant contribution to the formation of an informed public opinion, but among 
Bork's opponents Ms. Futrell alone was indiscreet enough to mention them publicly. Others 
assiduously avoided such questions, presumably because raising them would risk focusing atten-
tion on the obvious next question: What precisely did Bork's opponents want an "un-stagnant" 
Court to do to "assure full rights for all?" See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text. 
50. Hearings, supra note 3, at 4453. 
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People for the American Way (PAW) extended the attack. In an 
ad headlined "Robert Bork vs. The People," it informed readers that 
"[r]ecent studies reveal that Judge Bork has already made up his mind 
that large corporations are nearly always right." To support that 
rather serious charge it pointed to a study that "found that he favored 
corporations over consumers 96% of the time,"s1 apparently a refer-
ence to a study by Ralph Nader's Public Citizen Litigation Group, a 
study somewhat marred by the minor methodological flaw of exclud-
ing ninety percent of the cases in which Bork had participated.s2 
PAW also sponsored a television commercial that featured Gregory 
Peck warning that "Robert Bork wants to be a Supreme Court Justice 
but the record shows he has a strange idea of what justice is. He de-
fended poll taxes and literacy tests which kept many Americans from 
voting. "S3 
The willingness of the coalition to play upon public ignorance and 
fear in its effort to arouse sentiment against Bork is nicely illustrated 
by its treatment of his decision in American Cyanamid, s4 a case in 
which the sole issue was whether the act of a company in informing 
fertile women that they might retain their jobs if they underwent ster-
ilization was a "hazard" within the meaning of the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act. The women held jobs that exposed them to 
irreducible lead levels harmful to fetuses, and since OSHA requires 
protection of employees from that risk, the women were to be dis-
charged or transferred. ss Bork wrote for a unanimous court, sus-
taining the determinations of both an administrative law judge and the 
OSH Review Commission that the word "hazards," within the mean-
ing of the Act, was limited to processes and materials and did not 
encompass the option given to these employees. S6 
Pollsters had found that the decision was an ideal one for the coali-
tion to exploit. "It showed," as Bronner writes, "that Bork opposed 
women's rights, favored big business, and - get this! - approved of 
sterilization" (p. 179). When informed of the decision, seventy-seven 
51. Hearings, supra note 3, at 4454 (advertisement reprinted in statement by Comm. For a 
Fair Confirmation Process). 
52. Pp. 150-51; see also Anthony, Judge Robert Bork's Decisions in Which He Wrote No 
Opinion: An Analysis of the Regulatory and Benefit Cases, in Hearings, supra note 3, at 1548 
(discussing Bork's decisions and participation in business and regulatory cases). 
53. Hearings, supra note 3, at 4455 (reprinting advertisement). Bork had criticized the 
Supreme Court's decisions in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), and Harper v. Vir-
ginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), which is not quite the same as defending literacy tests 
and poll taxes. 
54. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers v. American Cyanamid Co., 741 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 
1984). 
55. Counsel for O.C.A.W. conceded at oral argument that the company might lawfully have 
adopted a policy that only sterile women would be employed in the positions. 741 F.2d at 449-
50. 
56. 741 F.2d at 449. 
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percent of those polled said they were "much less inclined" to approve 
of Bork (p. 178). The coalition knew what to do with that informa-
tion. PAW informed the readers of its newspaper ad, in a paragraph 
boldly headed "Sterilizing workers," that 
a major chemical company was pumping so much lead into the work 
place that female employees who became pregnant were risking having 
babies with birth defects. Instead of cleaning up the air, the company 
ordered all women workers to be sterilized or lose their jobs. When the 
union took the company to court, Judge Bork voted in favor of the 
company.57 
Planned Parenthood, similarly, wrote that "[i]n a case involving a 
company which produced dangerous amounts of toxic lead, Bork re-
fused to strike down a company policy which required female employ-
ees to become sterilized or to be fired from their jobs."58 And the 
National Abortion Rights Action League wrote simply that 
"[a]ccording to Bork women can be forced to choose between being 
sterilized and losing their jobs."59 
Each of the ads contained other misrepresentations and distor-
tions, 60 but those that have been cited are adequate to convey the fla-
vor of the campaign. 61 The extreme rhetoric reflected, in part, a 
57. Hearings, supra note 3, at 4454. 
58. Heanilgs, supra note 3, at 4453. 
59. Hearings, supra note 3, at 4452. 
60. Among the disturbing elements of the campaign, perhaps especially for those familiar 
with the McCarthy era, was the dredging up of an article Bork had written in 1963 opposing 
enactment of a bill that was to become the public accommodations title of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964. Bork, Civil Rights - A Challenge, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 31, 1963, at 21. In the 
intervening years, Bork had not only repudiated his earlier opposition to the legislation, but had 
abandoned the libertarianism on which the opposition had been based. Pp. 67-70. Compare 
Bork, The Supreme Court Needs a New Philosophy, FORTUNE, Dec. 1968, at 138 with Bork, 
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971). Nevertheless, 
Bork's opponents repeatedly sought to tar him with the article, a tactic sadly reminiscent of that 
employed in the 1950s, when individuals who had long since abandoned their earlier Communist 
sympathies were attacked for positions they had taken two decades earlier. 
PAW went further, carefully choosing its words to convey the impression that Bork still 
adhered to the views he had expressed in 1963 and, indeed, managing even to distort what he said 
at that time. In the 1963 article, after acknowledging "the ugliness of racial discrimination," 
Bork had written that the premise underlying anti-discrimination legislation "is that if I find 
your behavior ugly by my standards, moral or aesthetic, and if you prove stubborn about adopt-
ing my view of the situation, I am justified in having the state coerce you into more righteous 
paths. That is itself a principle of unsurpassed ugliness." Bork, Civil Rights-A Challenge, THE 
NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 31, 1963, at 22. PAW's ad purported to describe Bork's position on civil 
rights in a paragraph headed (in bold face) "Tum back the clock on civil rights?" The paragraph 
continued: " 'Unsurpassed ugliness.' That's how Professor Bork described a law that said hotels 
and restaurants had to serve black Americans .... Ask yourself: Should America go back and 
re-fight settled civil rights battles? If Robert Bork is on the Court, we may have to." Hearings, 
supra note 3, at 4454. 
61. The calumny of the ads was magnified in a number of ways. Literature produced by local 
organizations repeated the misrepresentations and distortions and added some of their own. For 
a sampling, see pp. 179-80; Hearings, supra note 3, at 4870-71, 4873, 5587. In addition, the 
claims made against Bork were "news" and as such they received a good deal of attention from 
the media. Bronner provides a trenchant, if brief, analysis of the reasons that "the charges were 
1316 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 88:1300 
genuine sense of fear and outrage at the prospect of Bork's appoint-
ment. During the past several decades, many liberals have come to 
think of the Court as their branch of government, in much the way 
that farmers regard themselves as having a special claim on the Agri-
culture Department, business interests regard themselves as having a 
special claim on the Commerce Department, and so on:62 it is, or at 
least ought to be, their voice in the corridors of power. Paradoxically, 
the passion with which liberals lay claim to the Court owes much to 
the belief that they are not an "interest group" like farmers or shop-
keepers: they do not look to it merely for the protection of their inter-
ests, but for the expression of values and the vindication of rights. 
Their belief that they have a claim upon the Court thus comes clothed 
in a moral fervor that interests alone are unlikely to generate. Bork 
had been openly critical of many of the decisions responsible for this 
proprietary attitude, reason enough for outrage at the thought he 
might now sit on the Court. 63 His nomination was an affront. 
More was at stake than liberal sensibilities, however. Bork's ap-
pointment would threaten, if not doom, the prospects for extending 
those decisions. The fear that the campaign sought to excite, that 
Bork's appointment would lead to wholesale reversal of the many de-
cisions he had criticized, was never very realistic. Not only were most 
of the decisions too firmly woven into the fabric of constitutional law 
but, probably more significantly, the political will to reopen most of 
the issues was lacking. 64 The realistic fear, one on which the cam-
paign did not dwell, was that, with the Court's current membership, 
the combined weight of Bork's vote and the intellectual influence that 
he might be expected to have upon the Court's deliberations would 
end the hope that the Court might continue to act as an agent of pro-
gressive social change, a role that many liberals had come to regard as 
among its most important.65 A "moderate" in Justice Powell's image, 
someone inclined toward open-ended balancing of all the considera-
tions bearing upon the issues brought to the Court, might be expected 
fully aired, but not their rebuttal." P. 150. And, of course, the charges were frequently repeated 
in settings - e.g., radio and television programs - of which no record remains. 
62. See T. LoWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM (1969). 
63. Interest groups understand, of course, that an unsympathetic Administration cannot be 
expected to appoint individuals whd will forcefully advocate their interests, but the appointment 
of people whose views are antithetical to what they regard as their interests violates the unwritten 
rules of American politics. In this perspective, Bork's nomination might be seen as the 
equivalent of nominating Ralph Nader to head the Commerce Department or an outspoken 
opponent of affirmative action to be Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights. 
64. The obvious exceptions were, of course, affirmative action, on which the Court had not 
yet charted a firm course, and abortion. 
65. To say that the coalition that conducted the campaign did not dwell on that fear is nn 
understatement. It took considerable care to guard against drawing attention to its fears, even to 
the point of exacting from its members the ultimate sacrifice, an agreement that none would 
testify at the hearings and thereby risk exposure of their constitutional views. See pp. 300-01; M. 
PERTSCHUK & W. SCHAETZEL, supra note 8, at 226-34. 
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to cast a "politically correct" vote on at least some issues even if he or 
she were of a conservative bent. Bork, however, was guided by a con-
stitutional theory that eschewed just such a role for the Court. His 
appointment thus threatened not just to slow the pace the Court had 
maintained in the Warren and early Burger years, as the appointment 
of a moderate would, but to bring it to a halt. 
The rhetoric of the campaign was not, however, simply a cri de 
coeur expressing the fear and outrage that so many liberals felt at the 
prospect of Bork's appointment. Its tone and deceptions were more 
calculated. Almost immediately after the nomination, Michael Pert-
schuk (of The People Rising) co-authored a paper entitled The Bork 
Nomination: Seizing the Symbols of the Debate, which argued that 
"Bork must come to be seen as an extreme ideological activist serving 
as Reagan and Meese's political agent, dispatched to achieve what 
they could not achieve in Congress, with the result of changing the 
Constitution, uprooting four decades of settled constitutional prece-
dents." The paper went on to suggest that the campaign should affix 
to Bork such labels as ''judicial extremist," ''judicial reactionary," 
"enemy of the Bill of Rights," and "right-wing ideologue" (pp. 156-
57). 
A poll sponsored by the coalition provided additional guidance. 
Among the conclusions drawn from it was that the public would re-
gard the nomination "as increasingly unattractive the more Bork 
could be painted as someone with biases against groups or causes. It 
would not be enough to show that Bork was extremely conservative; 
he would have to harbor some kind of agenda" (p. 159). The pollsters 
went on to caution against too much substance: "To engage public 
opinion, Bork's opponents must keep their message clear, simple and 
direct. Again and again, we find that forays into constitutional law or 
judicial theory have the effect of impeding public understanding of the 
fundamental objections to Bork's nomination" (p. 159). An effort to 
avoid "impeding public understanding" by "forays into constitutional 
law or judicial theory" is, presumably, what accounted for the "clear, 
simple and direct" assertions in the coalition's ads. 
The public, at which the campaign was aimed, did not, of course, 
have a vote on whether or not Bork should be confirmed. The deci-
sion was made by the Senate, whose members, it may be assumed, 
were less likely than the public to have been misled by the rhetoric, 
simplicities, half-truths, and untruths of the campaign. Senators, 
moreover, had the benefit of a record made by the Judiciary Commit-
tee at hearings that provided an opportunity to examine the nominee's 
record and to explore issues in more depth than is possible in a media 
campaign directed at the public. Extraordinary naivete would be re-
quired, however, to imagine that the campaign, through its impact on 
public opinion, did not significantly influence the Senate vote or to 
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suppose, as Pertschuk and Schaetzel argue, that its primary influence 
was merely to free Senators from pro-confirmation pressures that 
would otherwise have prevented them from exercising independent 
and conscientious judgment. 66 
The Senate, it seems too obvious to point out, is a political body. 
Whether or not men are political animals, there is no doubt that Sena-
tors are. Politics suffuses the work of the Senate. It makes no sense to 
ask how the Senate, apart from politics, would have voted "on the 
merits," and then to ask, as a separate question, whether political con-
siderations altered the outcome. Politics and "the merits" cannot be 
severed in that way. 
In any event, the testimony of witnesses and, more especially, the 
"questioning" and comments of Committee members were often not 
markedly different in tone and quality from the campaign that was 
being waged on the outside. No doubt, the hearings also had another 
side. Legitimate questions were raised - about Bork's personal com-
mitments67 and intellectual characteristics, 68 the consistency of posi-
tions he had taken, 69 and his positions on a wide range of legal issues. 
Often, the discussion of those issues occurred at a level appropriate to 
their seriousness, without resort to populist rhetoric that would play 
upon the ignorance and fears of the public. Senate hearings, however, 
are not academic lectures or appellate court arguments. Especially 
when public interest has been aroused, shaping public opinion ranks 
high among their goals, with inevitable consequences for the tone and 
quality of the proceedings. Issues must be presented in a manner that 
is not only accessible to the public, but that will capture its attention. 
Bronner deftly captures the point, when he writes, in assessing Bork's 
testimony, that "Bork had not understood the nature of the proceed-
ing. In fact, the nominee was getting it all wrong. He had prepared 
for a bench trial, but with the entire nation watching, this was a jury 
trial" (p. 226). Others did not make the same mistake. 
The demagoguery of the campaign thus found its way into the 
hearing room. Even when inflammatory rhetoric was avoided, the 
66. M. PERTSCHUK & w. SCHAETZEL, supra note 8, at 251. 
67. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 3, at 2122, 2127 (testimony of John Hope Franklin): 
There is no indication - in his writings, his teachings, or his rulings - that this nominee 
has any deeply held commitment to the eradication of the problem of race or even of its 
mitigation. One searches his record in vain to find a civil rights advance that he has sup-
ported from its inception. 
68. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 3, at 2331, 2333 (testimony of Shirley Hufstedler): 
In examining Judge Bork's record as an academician, as a high-ranking member of the 
executive branch of the Federal Government, and as a judge, the evidence discloses his quest 
for certitudes to resolve the ambiguities of the Constitution and of the Supreme Court's role 
in constitutional adjudication, and an effort to develop constitutional litmus tests to avoid 
his having to confront the grief and untidiness of the human condition. 
69. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 3, at 713 (Sen. Arlen Specter questioning whether Bork's 
"expansive" views on executive power were consistent with his rejection of an expansive and 
evolving right to liberty). 
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message repeatedly conveyed at the hearings was that in constitutional 
law - indeed, in law generally - reasons are irrelevant. Only results 
count. Judicial decisions are to be assessed - and courts are presuma-
bly to decide cases - as though judges have unlimited authority to 
reach results consistent with the intuitive response of a public that has • 
given no thought to the issues and is unaware of the full range of con-
siderations bearing upon them. A few examples will illustrate the 
point. 
Senator Howard Metzenbaum inveighed at length against the deci-
sion in American Cyanamid, 70 asserting that because women should 
not be forced to choose between sterilization and the jobs they want, 
Bork's failure to protect them from that choice was "shocking," 
"frightening" and "inhumane."71 Former Congresswoman Barbara 
Jordan, with customary eloquence, explained to the Committee (and 
to the television audience) that her own political career had depended 
upon the Supreme Court's reapportionment decisions. Recalling that 
Bork had disapproved of the " 'one person-one vote' " formula as a 
constitutional " 'strait-jacket' " for which there is no " 'theoretical ba-
sis,' " she commented, "Maybe not, gentlemen. Maybe there is no the-
oretical basis for one person, one vote, but I will tell you this much. 
There is a common sense, natural, rational basis for all votes counting 
equally."72 The same theme pervaded Senator Kennedy's perform-
ance. As he stated in the peroration to his first round of "questions" 
to Judge Bork, by way of dismissing the latter's constitutional argu-
ments regarding the limits of judicial authority, "Lawyers can always 
make technical points, but a justice ought to be fair."73 Bronner can-
nily observes that 
[w]ith network cameras focused on him, Kennedy was playing Oliver 
North. He was appealing to the strong pragmatic, populist sentiment in 
the country, the kind that distrusted lawyers who "make technical 
points" and proceed to take away people's rights. His manner offended 
many intellectuals of both left and right. But Kennedy was not after 
their approval. He was aiming at a wider audience. [p. 226] 
Bork's defeat produced euphoria among liberals across the nation. 
Others might think, as John Patrick Diggins has recently written, that 
"[a] victory won at the expense of the truth ... was not liberalism's 
finest hour,"74 but they had saved their Court from its most prominent 
critic. In doing so, however, they may also have changed the rules of 
the appointment process in ways that will prove less to their liking. 
70. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text. 
71. Hearings, supra note 3, at 467-69. 
72. Hearings, supra note 3, at 1004-05. 
73. Hearings, supra note 3, at 158. 
74. Diggins, The Judge Pleads His Case, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1989, § 7 (Book Review), at 
15. 
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Some pages ago, I suggested that the Bork controversy may have 
opened a new chapter in the Court's history, one in which nomina-
tions are, not always but often, the subject of campaigns that bear a 
strong resemblance to campaigns for political office. 75 The success of 
· the campaign against confirmation demonstrates that citizens can be 
mobilized on the issue of Supreme Court appointments, and it seems 
quite plausible to suppose that presidents76 and their political oppo-
nents77 will each, at times, find it advantageous to do so. Increased 
public participation in the selection of justices is, for that reason, an all 
but inevitable consequence of the perceived importance of the Court's 
decisions and the influence that the personal views of the justices have 
upon those decisions. If that judgment is accurate, both the Court and 
proponents of an activist judiciary would do well to consider the wis-
dom of assigning to the Court the role that the latter envision for it, 
one in which, to recall Professor Tribe's words, "fundamental choices 
about what sort of society we wish to become turn on who sits on the 
Court."78 
The lesson to be drawn from the Bork nomination, as I shall argue 
briefly in closing, is that an enlarged role for the public in the selection 
of the justices is likely to affect every stage of the ·process, from the 
identification of candidates to the choice of nominees, on into the hear-
ings, and inevitably in the Senate vote on confirmation. The Court is, 
in brief, likely to become more deeply enmeshed in politics, threaten-
ing its ability (and that of inferior courts) to discharge responsibilities 
that are both central and uncontroversial within the American 
tradition. 
In the course of a heated polemic published shortly before the 
commencement of the hearings, Renata Adler charged that Bork, 
"through his judicial opinions," had engaged in "a lobbying effort ... 
for a position on the Court."79 Pertschuk and Schaetzel point to 
Bork's speeches while a judge in support of a similar charge. 80 Be-
cause I lack their gift of reading other's minds, I shall withhold com-
ment on the truth of these allegations. The allegations do, however, 
75. See supra text accompanying notes 35-39. 
76. See supra text accompanying notes 21-22. 
77. Among the motivations of some of those who opposed Bork's confirmation, as both Bat-
tle for Justice and The People Rising clearly reveal, was the belief that the controversy offered an 
opportunity to invigorate a liberal coalition that in recent years had fared poorly at the national 
level. See PP· 182, 186; M. PERTSCHUK & W. SCHAETZEL, supra note 8, at 230-31, 275-91. To 
recognize that motivation does not, of course, in any way impugn the sincerity of the stated 
grounds for opposing confirmation. 
78. Supra note 4. 
79. Adler, Coup at the Court, The New Republic, Sept. 14 & 21, 1987, at 48. ("Usually these 
missives were addressed to Attorney General Edwin Meese; in this single instance [an opinion 
supporting two columnists in a libel action], Bork addressed instead a vital instrument of that 
campaign, the press.") Id. 
80. M. PERTSCHUK & W. SCHAETZEL, supra note 8, at 17. 
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suggest issues that deserve attention. Whether or not the belief is justi-
fied, the public utterances of prominent candidates for appointment to 
the Court are likely to be perceived by some as campaign speeches, a 
perception that significantly threatens public confidence in the judicial 
process. Perhaps, as I have argued elsewhere, sitting judges should 
avoid extra-judicial pronouncements bearing upon live legal issues, 81 
but they can hardly avoid writing opinions, with the risk that those 
opinions will thereafter be understood as planks in a campaign plat-
form rather than good faith efforts to decide cases according to law. 
The decisions of a sitting justice, similarly, may be understood as 
merely carrying out a campaign promise rather than a conscientious 
effort to carry out the responsibilities of the office. 
More troubling than the potential erosion of public confidence in 
the judiciary is the possibility that the suspicions underlying it may be 
justified. Aspirants may campaign for a seat on the Court. Among 
the lessons of the Bork nomination, which in no way depends upon an 
assessment of his motivations, is that a high profile on controversial 
issues can constitute an effective campaign platform, creating a con-
stituency favoring appointment. 82 Individuals have, of course, often 
campaigned for appointment, invoking sectional or partisan claims, 
calling in political debts owed to them or to those with whom they 
have connections, and so on. 83 The difference between a campaign 
conducted on such grounds and one based upon a platform con-
structed out of stands on controversial legal issues is, however, of some 
consequence. The latter, unlike the former, significantly threatens, if 
indeed it is not flatly inconsistent with, disinterested performance of 
the judicial office. A justice who has successfully waged a substantive 
campaign for appointment has made commitments that cannot lightly 
be set aside merely because he is now confronted with previously un-
anticipated arguments or because an issue looks different, as at times it 
will, after appointment than it did before. 84 
Equally troubling is the possibility that aspiration for higher office, 
and the knowledge that they may one day be called to account pub-
licly for their performance, may influence the decision of judges on 
inferior courts. In some measure, of course, that risk is unavoidable. 
Judges, some of whom are ambitious, will be called upon to decide 
81. Sandalow, Book Review, 67 MICH. L. REV. 599 (1969) (reviewing A. FORTAS, CON-
CERNING DISSENT AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (1968)). 
82. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text. Of course, it may, as the controversy over 
Bork demonstrates, also create opposition. That possibility, as every successful politician knows, 
only suggests the need for care in crafting a platform. 
83. See, e.g., H. AsHMORE, UNSEASONABLE TRUTHS 193-99 (1989). 
84. For celebrated instances of such changes, see, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); and compare United States v. United 
States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (Powell, J.) with Justice Powell's pre-appointment 
position on the same issue. P. 23. See also What Nixon's Court Nominees Have Said About Key 
Issues, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 8, 1971, at 40-41. 
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controversial cases, and there is in the end no alternative to reliance 
upon their courage and integrity. The appropriate question is not 
whether those virtues will at times be required, but the frequency with 
which they will and whether the prospect of some day having to de-
fend decisions in a public contest over appointment to the Court will 
exert a subtle influence on a judge's decisions. The campaign waged 
against Bork, at the least, suggests grounds for concern. After that 
campaign, for example, would an ambitious judge approach American 
Cyanamid in the same way he would have prior to the campaign? 
Might another such judge wonder whether it would be prudent to 
compute the percentage of cases in which she had voted with corpora-
tions and against individuals? The point of these questions is not to 
suggest that we can create a world free of such pressures, but that the 
pressures are greatly multiplied when the public participates in select-
ing justices. Professional politicians, whether or not they are lawyers, 
are likely to understand that legal issues are often complex and that 
judicial authority is limited. The general public does not, and as a 
result, the decisions of an inferior court judge are, as the campaign 
against Bork demonstrates, fodder for demagogues. 
Increased public participation in the selection of the justices may, 
thus, significantly affect the behavior of candidates for nomination. It 
may also come to exert an influence on the qualifications for appoint-
ment. It might have been helpful, for example, if Bork were more 
telegenic. Indeed, prior to the hearings, several Senators informed the 
White House that Bork should shave off his beard. His "record was 
unsettling enough. He needed all the help he could get in looking all-
American. "85 After the hearings, National Public Radio's influential 
law correspondent, Nina Totenberg, commenting upon the influence 
of television on the process, wrote: "If Robert Bork had looked like 
Cary Grant, perhaps the public would have responded less harshly, 
perhaps not. We will never know for sure. Television is a reality, 
however, and like it or not, we will have to live with it .... "86 
Television, which is merely a way of referring to the need to appeal 
to a mass audience, may also demand other qualifications. Among 
Bork's failings at the hearings, nicely captured in Bronner's observa-
tion that he had prepared for a bench trial, not a jury trial (p. 226), 
was his inability to defend his positions in terms accessible to the pub-
lic. The ability to communicate effectively with a mass audience, e.g., 
to capsulize a position on a complex issue in a way that will make a 
85. P. 195. The White House rejected the idea, but only because "good packaging meant 
invisible packaging. Shaving off a twenty-year-old beard just before public hearings would draw 
more negative publicity than the beard itself." Id. Senator Heflin was sufficiently troubled about 
public reaction to the beard "and the way he [Bork] wears his hair" that he raised the issue at the 
hearings. P. 294. 
86. Totenberg, The Confirmation Process and the Public: To Know or Not to Know, 101 
HARV. L. REv. 1213, 1221 (1988). 
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good "sound bite" on the evening news, has not heretofore been re-
garded as a qualification for appointment to the Supreme Court. Nor 
is its relevance to the Court's work very obvious. But it would surely 
have been useful to Bork, as it would be to any future nominee who 
has aroused public controversy. I do not mean to suggest that Bork 
would have been confirmed if he had been more skillful in this respect, 
or even that he would have if he had had greater skill and also looked 
"all-American." Perhaps he would have been, perhaps not. As Ms. 
Totenberg writes, "We will never know for sure." The point, rather, is 
that, to the extent that the public participates in the process of ap-
pointing members of the Court, the bases of selection will come to 
approximate those for selecting elected officials. 
The need to justify a position in terms that are persuasive to the 
public is also likely to have substantive consequences. Some positions 
just are harder than their opposites to justify to a nonprofessional au-
dience, especially when they are the subject of demagogic attack. 
They are not, for that reason, illegitimate, and they may even be pref-
erable. Though some will regard it as impermissibly elitist to say so, it 
is folly to expect the public to understand and evaluate positions that 
depend upon knowledge it takes years to acquire and that are the 
product of reflection on an intellectual tradition. Bork's reasons for 
rejecting an "unstructured" right of privacy and his positions on anti-
trust, for example, may or may not make for good law, but it is foolish 
to suppose that either can be evaluated by the public. The defense of 
such positions in a televised hearing is simply not likely to be success-
ful, and the nominee who wishes to gain confirmation might well con-
clude that it would be best not to make the effort. Better to take 
positions that are likely to have greater public appeal or that will avoid 
hostile questions by potential adversaries on the Committee. Positions 
taken at the hearings are not, of course, binding subsequent to confir-
mation, but few successful nominees are likely to ignore them. 
The increasingly probing character of the confirmation process sig-
nificantly adds to the risk that members of the Court will be con-
strained by public positions taken prior to their appointment. Within 
the space of several decades the tradition that Supreme Court nomi-
nees did not testify at their confirmation hearings has yielded initially 
to an understanding that they would testify, but avoid comment on 
specific legal issues and then, in the Bork hearings, to an expectation 
that the nominee would discuss his judicial philosophy with sufficient 
particularity to permit the Senate and the public to understand its im-
plications. Bork was accordingly drawn into discussion of quite spe-
cific legal issues, leading him to state positions that, had he been 
confirmed, would necessarily have embarrassed his performance as a· 
member of the Court. To be sure, Bork's record made it unusually 
difficult for him to avoid being drawn into such discussions, but now 
that the precedent has been established, future nominees will not find 
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it easy to escape with the banalities and platitudes that have heretofore 
been regarded as satisfactory. There is no ready answer to the claim 
that the public and its senatorial representatives can meaningfully par-
ticipate in the appointment decision only if they have information 
about the nominee on which to base a judgment.87 Opponents and 
even those who are merely wary of a nominee will inevitably be led to 
test the latter's general statements by seeking to elicit additional infor-
mation about his views.88 Just how far the traditional proprieties will 
give way is still uncertain, but in an era dominated by mass communi-
cations, the public's "right to know" has become a nearly irresistible 
force. As every Senator knows, moreover, eliciting information is not 
the only purpose served by questions that are put to nominees. They 
are also a way of constraining a nominee's subsequent decisions. 
Many of the concerns thus far expressed about the consequences of 
subjecting Supreme Court nominations to a test of popular approval 
might be substantially mitigated if it were likely that public discussion 
would be conducted at a level calculated to illumine the issues. The 
campaign waged against Bork does not suggest that public debate of 
that character can be expected. 89 The careful reader will have dis-
cerned that I do not admire that campaign nor much that occurred 
before the Judiciary Committee; indeed, that I deplore the excesses 
and distortions that characterized both. I deplore them, however, in 
much the same way that I deplore hurricanes, tidal waves, and earth-
quakes. Some years ago, in commenting upon complaints by defend-
ers of the Warren Court against what may euphemistically be 
described as the "rhetorical excesses" of its critics, Professor Louis 
Jaffe wrote of the inevitability of public response to the decisions of a 
Court that " 'makes policy' " - ~'not just the 'informed' criticism of 
law professors but the deep-felt, emotion-laden, unsophisticated reac-
tion of the laity."90 Jaffe was, I think, precisely right. These charac-
teristics of public discussion seem to be an unavoidable feature of our 
political life, at least on those occasions when politics cuts deeply into 
issues about which feelings are intense. However distressing, they 
have come to be an expected part of the rough-and-tumble of 
democracy. 
They are far more troublesome when they intrude upon the selec-
tion of judges. QI The central justification for an independent judiciary 
87. Id. 
88. Justice Kennedy's success in deflecting most questions that called for an expression of his 
views on controversial legal issues may be cited as demonstrating that the Bork hearings were 
atypical. However, Senate Democrats had reasons for avoiding a contest over Kennedy. It 
would, therefore, be a mistake to read very much into their failure to subject him to more inten· 
sive scrutiny. 
89. Nor, it might be added, does our recent experience with campaigns for elective office. 
90. See Jaffe, Impromptu Remarks, 76 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1111, 1111 (1963). 
91. Mark Tushnet's recent suggestion that "Judge Bork's supporters have objected to the 
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is its ability to operate at a remove from the passions of politics - to 
decide individual cases "on the merits" and, especially in constitu-
tional cases, to take a longer view than is possible for those who are 
under pressure from an aroused public or from politically powerful 
groups. Yet, just because I regard these pressures as inevitable, my 
purpose in directing attention to the deplorable quality of public dis-
cussion during the Bork controversy is not mainly to criticize the par-
ticipants, much less to suggest that the partisans on either side were 
primarily at fault.92 It is, rather, to suggest that these characteristics 
of public debate over Supreme Court nominations may well be una-
voidable if the Court remains in the vanguard of social reform, impos-
ing constitutional solutions for controversial political issues even when 
those solutions lack a foundation in our constitutional traditions. The 
remedy for the ill-tempered and overheated debates on Supreme Court 
nominations that we have experienced over the past two decades is not 
to call futilely for more responsible debate, but appropriate restraint in 
the exercise of judicial power. 
Academic discussion of the threat to judicial independence that an 
activist judiciary may produce has tended to focus on such direct at-
tacks as the Roosevelt "Court-packing" plan and the "jurisdiction-
stripping" bills that have been proposed in recent years. The greater 
threat, in my judgment, is that suggested by the controversy over the 
Bork nomination - which, it bears repeating, is merely an evolution-
ary step in a series of such controversies over the past twenty years. 
As the public and its leaders increasingly come to see the justices as 
political actors, whose function is not markedly different from that of 
other political actors, both the processes and bases of selection are 
likely to approximate, more and more closely, those for the selection 
of other political actors. If that occurs, no one - on either side of the 
debate over Judge Bork - will be very happy with the outcome. 
sort of political behavior that they expected Judge Bork to approve if confirmed," Tushnet, Prin-
ciples, Politics, and Constitutional Law, 88 MICH. L. REv 49, 80 (1989), misconceives the prem-
ises underlying arguments for judicial restraint. The political process to which advocates of 
judicial restraint would have judges defer is not plebiscitary democracy, but a process in which 
public pressures are mediated by a complex set of institutions. See, e.g., Sandalow, Judicial 
Protection of Minorities, 15 MICH. L. REv. 1162, 1190-93 (1977). Moreover, one might regret 
certain tendencies in the political process without supposing that judges are competent to remedy 
them. 
92. The President's reasons for nominating Bork were, as I have already suggested, unlikely 
to have been qualitatively different from those that motivated Bork's opponents. In view of the 
inertial force of presidential nominations, an appeal to the public, on terms that would generate 
public interest, was necessary if Bork were to be defeated. Nothing in our political history sug-
gests that, if the situation had been reversed, the right would have been any less prone than the 
left was to employ the tactics that characterized the campaign. The disappointment, for some of 
us, was that the left proved to be no more immune to such tactics than the right has been. 
